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Municipal Civil Rights Legislation-Is the Power
Conferred by the Grant of Home Rule?
I. INTRODUCTION
The single most pressing problem facing today's urban cen-
ters is the denial of human rights to minority groups. In
attempting to cope with this dilemma, several Minnesota mu-
nicipalities' have enacted some form of "civil rights" legislation.2
Thus far no challenge to these municipalities' authority to take
this action has been made. As more municipalities enact such
legislation,3 however, it is appropriate to inquire whether in
fact the authority to do so exists. Any uncertainty with re-
spect to this issue must not only call into question the validity of
the measures already enacted, but also must serve as a deterrent
to the promulgation of similar legislation by other municipalities.
Consequently, resolution of this question will facilitate the ad-
ministration of government at both the municipal and state
levels.4
1. mNNEAPOLIS, Mix., CODE chs. 930, 942 (1960); ST. PAuL,
MNN., CODE ch. 74 (1965); DuLUTm, MiNN., CODE ch. 19 (1959);
GOLDEN VALLEY, MiNN., RES. 68 (1965) FRIDLEY, MINN., RES. 271 (1964).
2. "Municipal corporations" and "municipalities" are generic terms
which overlap in some respects but are distinct in others. No attempt
to define either is made in this Note. As used herein, the terms are
synonymous and refer in part to cities, villages, boroughs, counties and
towns.
The phrase "civil rights legislation" is used to refer to all measures
designed to prevent any form of discrimination based on race, creed or
color.
3. At the present time St. Louis Park, Bloomington, Richfield,
Hopkins, Robinsdale and Roseville are contemplating the adoption of
civil rights ordinances. Golden Valley is in the process of drafting a
new ordinance.
4. H. McBAiN, THE LAW AND PRAcTicE or MumcNiPAL HoaoE RULE
passim (1916) [hereinafter cited as McBAEN, MUNIcIPAL HoAmE RULE].
For example, Minneapolis has enacted an anti-discrimination ordinance
pursuant to the general welfare clause of its home rule charter. Mix-
NEAPOLIS, MINN., CODE ch. 930 (1966). In order to implement the power
of the commission established by this ordinance, the city did not simply
amend the ordinance pursuant to its welfare powers. Instead, it asked
the state legislature for a special grant conferring to the commission
those powers it thought necessary. See ch. 743 [1967] Minn. Laws 1547.
The argument can be made that this action by the City of Minneap-
olis-requesting greater power to deal with problems of civil rights-
evidences a belief of the municipality that such powers come only from
the state. However, this argument does not follow a fortiori. The
powers conferred by ch. 743 [1967] Minn. Laws 1547 are in the nature of
injunctive powers such as the power to issue cease and desist orders
and orders of reinstatement. Although a municipal ordinance can be
enforced by fine or imprisonment, one which conferred injunctive
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Any response to the question of whether a municipality has
power to legislate in a particular area requires reference to the
general principle which serves to distribute powers between state
and local governments. In Minnesota, this distribution is ac-
complished through the principle of "home rule" under which
most municipalities operate. 5 The home rule doctrine allows
municipal corporations to adopt their own charters and to deal
with matters of local concern without specific enabling legis-
lation from the state.6 The purpose of this Note is to determine
whether Minnesota Home Rule municipalities possess the power
to enact civil rights legislation and if so, to define the scope of
that power.
powers would not be enforceable in municipal court. See note 73 infra,
and accompanying text. This may be one explanation of the action
taken by the municipality.
5. Minnesota municipalities are of two types: (1) those which
are incorporated under the laws of the state and adopt these laws as
their charters and (2) those which adopt home rule charters pursuant
to MnM. CONsT. art. 4, § 36 (repealed, ch. 800 [1957] Minn. Laws 1087),
MINI-. CONST. art. 11, § 3, and MAN-. STAT. § 410.07 (1967). The former
are strictly regulated by state statute. MIN. STAT. chs. 365, 411, 412
(1965). The latter are also governed by the constitution and state
statutes, but their primary limitations are those discussed below.
6. Before the middle of the nineteenth century, state intervention
in municipal government took the form of special legislation dealing with
limited subjects and directed at particular municipalities. It was
thought by those involved in municipal affairs that municipal corpora-
tions possessed only those powers specifically granted them by their
charters or other legislation. Thus, when new exigencies arose charter
amendments or other statutory provisions were required. For example,
in 1870 the New York State Legislature passed a total of 808 pieces of
legislation, 212 of which were "special" acts for New York City.
McBAix, MuNicinAL HoAi RuLE 8. One way to reduce the need for
such intervention is to limit the state's power to legislate with respect
to particular municipal affairs. For example, state legislatures have
been specifically precluded from imposing taxes for municipal purposes,
from compelling municipalities to incur debts and from appointing
municipal officers. C. ANTmAu, MuNiciPAL CoapoRAioq LAW §§ 2.07-.10
(1967). Another alternative, proposed in dicta in LeRoy v. Hurlbut, 24
Mich. 44, 62 (1871) gives municipalities an inherent right of self govern-
ment not subject to limitation by the state or other governing body.
This approach was adopted in only three jurisdictions. See State
ex rel. Geake v. Fox, 158 Ind. 126 (1901); City of Lexington v. Thomp-
son, 113 Ky. 540 (1902); State v. Barker, 116 Ia. 96 (1902). It was
summarily rejected by the great majority of jurisdictions on the ground
that it did not conform to the principle that the municipality is a
creature of the state. See, e.g., Barnes v. District of Columbia, 91 U.S.
540 (1875); Minneapolis Street Ry. v. City of Minneapolis, 229 Minn.
502, 507, 40 N.W. 2d 353 (1949). See generally J. DILLON, COMMENTAR-
IES ON THE LAW OF MuNiciPAL CoRPO Tinoxs § 98 (5th ed. 1911). For a
complete discussion of the inherent right theory, including a convincing
refutation, see McBain, Doctrine of an Inherent Right of Local Self
Government, 16 COLmV. L. REv. 190, 299-315. (1916).
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II. THE EXISTENCE OF THE POWER
In order to determine whether a Minnesota municipality
has the power to legislate in a particular area it is necessary to
answer three questions: (1) Is legislation with respect to the
particular subject a "municipal function?" (2) Does the mu-
nicipality's home rule charter authorize such legislation? (3) Has
the state government preempted the area by enactment of the
State Act Against Discrimination?
A. LocAL MumIcIPAL FUNCTION
The grant of home rule power is of constitutional origin 7
and thus cannot be withdrawn by the state legislature. Munici-
pal power to legislate, however, is limited by the constitutional
requirement that the home rule charter be "consistent with and
subject to the laws of the state."'8 Thus, the scope of municipal
initiative is subject to definition by state statute.9
The first enabling statute defining the scope of municipal
power was enacted in 1889.10 This act was revised to its present
form in 1905.11 The portion relevant to the present discussion
provides that a municipal charter:
may [include] any scheme of municipal government not
inconsistent with the constitution, and may provide for.., the
regulation of all local municipal functions, as fully as the legis-
7. MmN. CONST. art. 11, § 3.
8. MIxN. CoNsT. art. 4, § 36. This was repealed by ch. 809
[1957] Laws of Minn. It was replaced by article XI, § 3 which provides
that "any city ... may adopt a home rule charter for its government in
accordance with this constitution and the laws." The majority of Min-
nesota home rule municipalities adopted charters pursuant to the former
grant. These are expressly validated by MfntN. CoNsT. art. 11, § 5.
Moreover, the replacement of the words "consistent with and subject to"
by the phrase "in accordance with" was probably intended merely to
avoid the argument that a state law on any subject will supersede a
municipal ordinance dealing with the same matter, made in cases such
as those cited in note 51 infra.
9. There are two types of grants of home rule authority: those
which are purely constitutional and those which are a combination of
constitutional and legislative provisions. As far as the scope of the
power is concerned, however, it is the particular grant and not the
method which is important. Sandalow, The Limits of Municipal Power
Under Home Rule-A Note for the Courts, 48 M Nw. L. REv. 643 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Sandalow, Municipal Power]. When home rule is
granted by the latter method the state naturally retains a greater degree
of power since municipal authority can be added or deleted by statute.
10. Ch. 351 [1899] Minn. Laws 462.




lature might have done before [the adoption of the constitu-
tional provision granting home rule powers] .... 12
This grant of authority clearly does not give municipalities the
power to legislate on all subjects not specifically proscribed by
the constitution. 13 As the statute indicates, municipalities may
legislate only when their actions would constitute "local mu-
nicipal functions."
The phrase "local municipal function" has not been defined
by the Minnesota court. This failure may be due in part to the
natural ambiguity of the phrase. It may also be due to the
paucity of analytical or philosophical discussion concerning the
proper relationship between local and state government. 4 Fi-
nally, it may be due to the availability of the nebulous concept of
police power which courts tend to discuss at length while ignor-
ing the question of the scope of municipal functions. 15
Notwithstanding the lack of authority, any definition of
"local municipal function" should be broad enough to permit
municipal enactment of civil rights measures. Civil rights is
an area in which local initiative is particularly appropriate.
The type and extent of discriminatory practices in a given com-
munity vary in relation to such factors as the depth of local
prejudice and the physical environment. These, in turn, are
affected by the character of the municipality and the number
of citizens against whom discriminatory actions might be ex-
pected. The most basic decision turning on the above factors is
whether or not to enact a civil rights ordinance in the first
place. The importance of familiarity with local conditions, how-
ever, does not end there. Such familiarity is also vital to the
actual composition of an effective civil rights ordinance. Any
decisions about the appropriateness of particular anti-discrim-
inatory provisions or about the overall scope of the ordinance
12. MmN. STAT. § 410.07 (1967).
13. See State ex rel. Peers v. Fitzgerald, 131 Minn. 116, 154 N.W.
750 (1916); Laird Norton Yards v. City of Rochester, 117 Minn. 114, 134
N.W. 644 (1912); Anderson, Municipal Home Rule in Minnesota, 7 MTUN.
L. REv. 306 (1922).
14. The proper relationship between state and federal govern-
ment has been the subject of analysis for two centuries. On the other
hand, it is only in recent years that writers have undertaken to analyze
the relationship between state and local government. One of the best
of these is AREA & PowEa (A. Maass ed. 1959).
15. In Village of Brooklyn Center v. Rippen, 255 Minn. 334, 96
N.W.2d 585 (1959), the court was faced with the question of whether a
municipality could require boats operating within the village limits to
obtain licenses. Instead of determining whether such licensing was a




must necessarily be strongly influenced by local considerations.
This need for knowledge of the particular locality is one of
the factors which originally gave rise to the home rule move-
ment. The movement was intended to remove the evils of
special legislation by conferring initiative upon municipal cor-
porations.' 6 This course eliminated not only the potential for
corruption inherent in special legislation, but also the need for
authorizing legislation in general. 17 Because of the variety of
factors bearing on civil rights legislation, this area is one in
which municipal initiative is most appropriate.' 8 Thus, inclusion
of civil rights in the home rule power is not only crucial to an
effective solution, but is also consistent with the fundamental
tenets of the doctrine.
The degree of municipal interest in the regulation of civil
rights lends further support for the argument that such legis-
lation should be considered a "local municipal function." It is
generally said that although the presence of statewide interest
does not prevent a subject from being one of municipal con-
cern, 19 it does mean that a high degree of local interest is
necessary for the subject to be held a local municipal function.20
Clearly municipalities are significantly interested in an end to
discrimination. Ninety-nine per cent of Minnesota's Negroes live
in cities.21 Most of the major social evils caused by discrimina-
tion, such as hardcore unemployment, are concentrated in the
central cities.22 Centers of unemployment and education-areas
in which discrimination affects the greatest number 23-are lo-
cated in municipalities. The riots and civil disorders which
result from discrimination occur almost exclusively in the
cities.24 These considerations indicate that the degree of mu-
nicipal interest in the promotion of civil rights legislation is
sufficiently high to justify its inclusion as a local municipal
function.25
16. See note 6 supra.
17. See Sandalow, Municipal Power 649-50.
18. See notes 15 & 16 supra, and accompanying text.
19. State v. Crabtree Co., 218 Minn. 36, 15 N.W.2d 48 (1944).
20. City of Duluth v. Cerveny, 218 linn. 511, 16 N.W.2d 779
(1944); Park v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 296, 159 N.W. 627 (1916).
21. Conference with Mrs. Viola Kanatz, former Deputy Comm'r of
Human Rights, April 26, 1968.
22. REPORT OF THE NATIONAL ADVISOR ComIssIoiN ONq CiVIm Dis-
oRDERS 414 (1968).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 203.
25. The requirement that municipal legislation be confined to
'local municipal functions" serves to ensure that the legislation will
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The need for administration and enforcement of civil rights
at the local level26 further strengthens the argument that regula-
tion of civil rights is a local municipal function.
Government initiative in the field of human relations is needed
at all levels, especially at the local level. Human relations
problems cannot be adequately solved until the government and
citizenry of each community . .. honestly face these problems
and ... work together for their solution.27
The ultimate goal of civil rights ordinances is the complete
abolition of discrimination. This can only be accomplished by
bringing about a change in individual attitudes. Since the in-
dividual tends to be most strongly influenced by his immediate
associations, 28 the more closely a legislative body approximates
that group the more strongly the individual will be influenced
to accept its goals.29 Thus municipal legislation is more likely
to effectuate the crucial change in attitude than legislation
promulgated by the state.
There is evidence that the state legislature itself believes
that civil rights legislation is a local municipal function. The
1967 amendments to the State Act Against Discrimination o in-
only affect members of the enacting municipality. In the area of mu-
nicipal taxation and spending the "public purpose" doctrine serves the
same function. See, e.g., City of Lexington v. Hager, 337 S.W.2d 27 (Ky.
1960) (public purpose doctrine requires that taxes be levied only for the
purposes of the particular taxing unit.) A taxing or spending measure
is considered to conform with a "public purpose" when it is "such an
activity as will serve as a benefit to the community as a body and
which, at the same time, is directly related to the functions of gov-
ernment." Visina v. Freeman, 252 Minn. 177, 184, 84 N.W.2d 635, 641
(1958). The regulation of civil rights clearly serves as a benefit to the
community, see note 19 passim and accompanying text. It is equally
clear that the promotion of the general welfare resulting from such
regulation is a governmental function. Thus the analogy to the area of
municipal taxation supports the conclusion that regulation of civil
rights is a local municipal function.
26. This need was recognized by the draftsmen of the Model Anti-
Discrimination Act. It was provided for by the creation of a system of
referrals to and from local commissions and by the inclusion of sections
specifically enabling municipalities to enact local civil rights ordinances.
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF CoMnMISSIONERS ON UNIFORMI STATE LAWS,
UNIFORM LAW COMMISSIONERS' MODEL ANTI-DscRIvrtx=ATION ACT §§ 902-
906 (1966) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT].
27. Witherspoon, Civil Rights Policy in the Federal System: Pro-
posals for a Better Use of Administrative Process, 74 YALE L.J. 1171,
1226 (1965).
28. D. WILcox, THE AMERICAN CITY: A PROBLEM IN DEMOCRACY
21 (1904).
29. Note, Municipal Fair Employment Practices Ordinances as a
Valid Exercise of the Police Power, 39 NoTRE DAME LAW. 607 (1964).
30. MINN. STAT. § 363.01-.13 (1967). It might also be argued that
the legislature merely contemplates municipal action only after seeking
express approval from the state. See note 4 supra.
1968]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
dicate that the legislature expects municipal action in this area.
The Act provides that the State Commissioner of Human Rights
may refer any matter covered by Chapter 363 to a "local com-
mission." "Local commissions" are defined as agencies
of a city, village or borough created pursuant to law, city char-
ter, or municipal ordinance, and conferring upon the agency
powers, including, but not limited to those which are conferred
upon the commissioner by chapter 363.31
This definition obviously implies that municipal corporations
have the power to establish civil rights commissions. Further-
more, the last part of the definition indicates that the draftsmen
contemplated the existence of municipal power to legislate be-
yond the mere establishment of commissions.
Although the factors discussed above lead inescapably to
the conclusion that civil rights legislation is a "local municipal
function," there are several additional considerations. One such
consideration is the need for statewide uniformity. In Village
of Brooklyn Center v. Rippen, 2 the court based its holding that
municipal licensing of boats is not a proper exercise of the police
power on the conclusion that boating is not "local" in nature.
In reaching this conclusion the ccurt considered the adverse
effect which disparate municipal licensing measures would have
on those who engaged in the sport in several different localities.
Thus, the inconvenience resulting from the lack of uniform regu-
lation was the basis for the denial of municipal power.
In the case of civil rights measures, the persons most af-
fected by the lack of uniformity would be those having sub-
stantial interests in many municipalities.33 Such persons, how-
ever, could avoid undue inconvenience by simply complying with
the most stringent municipal ordinance. Any inconvenience re-
sulting from such compliance is clearly outweighed by the ad-
vantage of permitting municipalities to experiment with local
solutions84 by going beyond the minimum limits set by the
State Act Against Discrimination.35
Another consideration is suggested by State ex rel. Peers
v. Fitzgerald.36 In that case the portions of a municipal charter
which granted the city council contempt powers were invali-
dated. Since the exercise of contempt powers represents a sub-
31. Id. § 363.115 (emphasis added).
32. 255 Minn. 334, 96 N.W.2d 585 (1959).
33. For example, a corporation employing large numbers of work-
ers and having plants in different municipalities.
34. See notes 15-16 supra and 81 infra, and accompanying text.
35. Alum. STAT. § 363.01-.13 (1967).
36. 131 Minn. 116, 154 N.W. 750 (1915).
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stantial interference with the freedom of those concerned, the
court feared that without statutory limitations the power would
be subject to serious abuse and might be "readily converted into
an instrument of oppression. '37 Its exercise, especially by "per-
sons of limited legal knowledge and experience,"3 8 could jeop-
ardize guarantees of fair procedure. The court, therefore, found
that the power to adopt a municipal charter does not include the
right to confer contempt powers on the city council, holding in
part that citations for contempt are not "local municipal func-
tions." This reasoning indicates that municipal legislation which
threatens basic community values and which is not subject to
strict limitations is beyond the scope of municipal power.3 9
The regulation of civil rights is subject to more direct con-
stitutional and statutory limitations than is municipal contempt
power.40 An arbitrary exercise of power is to be feared less
where a judicial as opposed to an administrative forum exists
to counteract this threat. Although potential conflicts between
guarantees of fair procedure and methods of administration
exist, they are not conflicts which inhere in the subject as in the
case of contempt powers. Therefore, municipal regulation of
civil rights does not present the threat foreseen by the Peers
court and should not be excluded from the scope of municipal
concern on that basis.
It has also been suggested by at least one writer that the
political processes at the local level may not be sufficiently
developed to make decisions on certain subjects.41 This author
contends that the relative homogeneity of a constituency and
its numerical size may result in the lack of a satisfactory ex-
change of ideas or adequate representation of minority or un-
popular views. Proponents of this theory argue, therefore, that
municipal action in this area should be beyond the scope of
"municipal functions. '42
37. Id. at 120, 154 N.W. at 753.
38. Id.
39. Sandalow, Municipal Power 708.
40. Municipal civil rights legislation is limited by constitutional
guarantees such as privacy and free speech. See St. Paul v. Dalsin, 245
Minn. 325, 71 N.W.2d 855 (1955). Local ordinances must also serve as
"an important adjunct in preserving the standard of regulation as
moulded by the general law." Duluth v. Evans, 158 Minn. 450, 197
N.W. 737 (1924).
41. Cf. Ylvisaker, Some Criteria for a "Proper" Areal Division of
Governmental Powers, in AREA AND PowER 27 (A. Maass, ed. 1959).
42. Mr. Ylvisaker contends that before being granted governmen-
tal powers a unit should contain sufficient diversity of interests to en-
sure effective debate. Id. at 37.
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The above argument is unpersuasive when applied to the
field of civil rights. The communities which have the greatest
need for civil rights legislation are those in which large num-
bers of citizens are affected by discriminatory practices. In
such communities, the very size of the minority population in-
sures lively debate. Thus, as the need for civil rights measures
increases, so does the likelihood that minority views will be
vigorously asserted.
B. CHARTER AUTHORITY
On balance, the above arguments indicate that regulation of
civil rights is a legitimate subject of municipal concern. Never-
theless the authority to legislate on such subjects must be con-
tained in the municipal charter. No charter has been found
with specific provisions authorizing the regulation of civil rights.
Although this defect could be cured by charter amendments,
such steps may not be necessary. The legislative power of
municipalities is not limited to subjects specifically covered by
the charter when the instrument contains a general grant of
"police powers,"43 or provisions such as those of the Minneapolis
charter enabling the council to "ordain, publish, enforce, alter
amend or repeal . . . ordinances for the government and good
order of the city .... "44 In the absence of express authority,
therefore, the power to regulate civil rights may stem from a
charter's general welfare provisions.
A decision on whether a particular act is for the general
well-being of the community is made by balancing the good
resulting from the act against the evil it causes society.45 Where
this balance has involved state civil rights acts, the statutes
have been upheld. 46 The same test is applied on the munici-
pal level.4 7 Thus, several foreign jurisdictions have held that
In the same study a second author argues that while Ylvisaker's
points on diversity may be well taken, it is also true that the debate
envisioned by Ylvisaker must take place in a social and psychological
unit. This can only be achieved in a viable and vital unit of govern-
ment which will necessarily be somewhat homogeneous. Thus the de-
sire for diversity can never be fully realized. Willbern, The States as
Components in an Areal Division of Powers, in AREA AMW POWER 70, 73
(A. Maass ed., 1959).
43. See State v. Morrow, 175 Minn. 386, 221 N.W. 423 (1928).
44. MmNsP.oLis, MumI., CODE ch. 4., § 5 (1965).
45. Cf. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1933); Miller v.
Schoene, 276 U.S. 272 (1928).
46. See People v. Bob-Lo Excursion Co., 317 Mich. 686, 27 N.W.2d
139 (1947), aff'd, 333 U.S. 28 (1948).
47. District of Columbia v. J.R. Thompson, Inc., 346 U.S. 100 (1953).
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the regulation of civil rights is within the scope of municipal
police power. The United States Supreme Court, interpreting a
statute granting the District of Columbia power to regulate all
"rightful subjects of legislation," held that an anti-discrimina-
tion ordinance was within the municipal police power.48  Sim-
ilarly, the Missouri court has stated that
[a] municipal ordinance, designed to prevent discrimination by
reason of race or color in restaurants bears a substantial and
reasonable relation to the ... grant of power to regulate . . .
[for] the health, comfort, safety, convenience and welfare of
the inhabitants of the city and is fairly referrable to the police
power of the municipal corporation.49
In Minnesota, a trend has developed in the direction of
expanding municipal police powers "to enable [municipalities]
to meet and provide for new conditions as they arise."50  This
trend is the result of a growing recognition that broad legislative
powers are necessary to deal effectively with the wide range of
problems encountered by municipalities. As has been noted,
civil rights problems can be most effectively dealt with at the
local level since they demand intimate knowledge of the par-
ticular community and the ability to adapt to changing con-
ditions. Thus, the reasons behind the trend towards expansion
of municipal police powers are peculiarly applicable to the area
of civil rights. It is clear, therefore, that legislation in this
area should be considered as within the general welfare or
police power provisions of municipal charters.
C. PREM=nToO
The presence of municipal power to legislate in the field of
civil rights does not by itself mean that home rule municipalities
may validly enact such ordinances. If the state, by its own
actions, has preempted the area of civil rights, then municipal-
ities are precluded from any independent action on this subject.51
48. Id.
49. Marshall v. Kansas City, 355 S.W.2d 877, 883 (Mo., 1962);
accord, Porter v. City of Oberlin, 3 Ohio App. 2d 158, 209 N.E.2d 629
(1964). Three jurisdictions have held that municipalities may not leg-
islate in the field of civil rights. Two of these did so on grounds of
preemption. Midwest Employers Council, Inc. v. Omaha, 177 Neb. 877,
131 N.W.2d 609 (1964); Mayor & City Council v. Smentkowski, -
Del. , 198 A.2d 685 (1964). In Nance v. Mayflower Tavern, Inc., 106
Utah 517, 150 P.2d 773 (1946), the Utah court held that a municipal
ordinance prohibiting discrimination in restaurants was invalid. It
concluded that the constitutional grant of home rule power did not
authorize such legislation and that the statutory authority to license and
regulate restaurants did not extend to the prohibition of discrimination.
50. State v. Morrow, 175 Minn. 386, 387, 221 N.W. 423 (1928).
51. The Minnesota Constitution provides that "any city or village
19681
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The Minnesota Supreme Court recently established a number
of tests to determine whether the state has preempted a given
field: 5
2
(1) What is [the nature of] the "subject matter" which is to
be regulated? (2) Has the subject matter been so fully cov-
ered by state law as to have become solely a matter of state
concern? (3) Has the legislature in partially regulating the
subject matter indicated that it is a matter solely of state con-
cern? (4) Is the subject matter itself of such a nature that local
regulation would have unreasonably adverse effects upon the
general populace of the state?53
The subject in question is the regulation of civil rights. The
legislature has dealt with this subject by adoption of the State
Act Against Discrimination. 4 In general, municipal regulations
of subjects covered by comprehensive state legislation have been
overturned on grounds of preemption when the court has found
that the adverse effects of the ordinances outweighed their
benefits.55 When adverse effects were absent, the court up-
held municipal ordinances despite comprehensive state legisla-
tion on the same subject.56 Thus, in asking whether a subject
has been so thoroughly covered as to be solely a state concern,
the narrower issue is whether, in the face of comprehensive
state regulation, the need for local initiative is sufficiently
great to justify its adverse effects. In the field of civil rights,
this question has already been answered affirmatively. 57
When state legislation is insufficiently comprehensive to
preempt a field of its own accord, preemption may be achieved
by an expression of intent. Thus, a municipal ordinance regu-
in this state may frame a charter for its own government as a city con-
sistent with and subject to the laws of this state .... " MnN. CoNsT.
art. 4, § 36. This phrase has been construed to mean that "local" ordi-
nances will be given effect unless they contravene legislatively ex-
pressed state policies. State ex rel. Town of Lowell v. City of Crook-
ston, 252 Minn. 526, 91 N.W.2d 81 (1958); Duluth v. Cerveny, 218 Minn.
511, 16 N.W.2d 779 (1944); Markely v. City of St. Paul, 142 Minn. 356,
172 N.W. 215 (1919); Park v. City of Duluth, 134 Minn. 296, 159 N.W. 627
(1916); Grant v. Berrisford, 94 Minn. 45, 101 N.W. 940 (1904).
52. Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield, 274 Minn. 347,
143 N.W.2d 813 (1966).
53. Id. at 358, 143 N.W.2d at 822.
54. MN. STAT. § 363.01-.13 (1967).
55. Minnetonka Elec. Co. v. Village of Golden Valley, 273 Minn.
301, 141 N.W.2d 138 (1966); Village of Brooklyn Center v. Rippen, 255
Minn. 334, 96 N.W.2d 585 (1959).
56. Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield, 274 Minn. 347,
143 N.W.2d 813 (1966); State ex rel. Sheahan v. Mulally, 257 Minn. 27,
99 N.W.2d 892 (1959); Duluth v. Cerveny, 218 Minn. 511, 16 N.W.2d 779
(1944).
57. See notes 14-29 supra, and accompanying text.
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lating driving while intoxicated was held invalid58 because the
state act on that subject provided that it should be "applicable
and uniform throughout this state and in all political subdi-
visions therein . . . ."59 Not only is there no such language in
the Act Against Discrimination but the state Attorney General
has issued a formal opinion to the effect that the Act was not
intended to be preemptive.60 Moreover, the 1967 amendments
provide for interaction between the state commissioner and
local commissions, which are defined as any agency of any
municipality with powers including "but not limited to those
which are conferred upon the commissioner" by the state act.61
This language clearly implies that the legislature contemplated
the enactment of civil rights measures by municipalities. It is
obvious, therefore, that the Act Against Discrimination does not
express an intent to be preemptive.
The fourth test of preemption established by the Minnesota
court asks whether the subject matter is "itself of such a nature
that local regulation would have unreasonably adverse effects
upon the general populace of the state."62  This is essentially
the same question which has already been dealt with in the
discussion of uniformity. It was concluded there that the ad-
vantages of granting municipalities enough power to effectively
handle the changing problems of civil rights outweigh the need
for uniformity.83  Thus it can be concluded that the regulation
of civil rights at the local level will not have unreasonably
adverse effects upon the general populace of the state.
III. THE SCOPE OF THE POWER
Since the ability to enact civil rights ordinances is among
the home rule powers given to Minnesota municipalities by the
constitution, and since the exercise of that power has not been
preempted by the state, the only remaining question concerns
the boundaries of and limitations on the power. Although there
is no case law which bears directly on this inquiry, a response is
made possible by reference to analogous areas. Laird Norton
Yards v. City of Rochester64 and City of Staples v. Minnesota
58. State v. Hoben, 256 Minn. 436, 98 N.W.2d 813 (1959).
59. MAi-W. STAT. § 169.03 (1959).
60. Op. Atty. Gen. 59 a-32 (#3a) June 1, 1966.
61. Mm. STAT. § 363.115 (1967) (emphasis added).
62. Mangold Midwest Co. v. Village of Richfield, 274 Minn. 347,
358, 143 N.W.2d 813, 822 (1966).
63. See notes 29-35 supra, and accompanying text.
64. 117 Minn. 114, 134 N.W. 644 (1912).
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Power and Light Company65 both involved a city's attempt to
avoid application of equitable estoppel theories. In both cases,
the court, using broad language, held that municipalities do not
possess the power to abrogate any "rules of common law or
equity. ' 66 If this dictum were applied to enactments in the
field of civil rights, municipal legislative power would be more
apparent than real since nearly every action would infringe
upon some common law right.
6 7
The indications are, however, that such an application will
not be forthcoming. Both Laird and Staples involved reliance
upon municipal action of a proprietary nature. Thus, the mu-
nicipalities were estopped from denying the validity of con-
tracts which would otherwise have been rendered invalid by
municipal ordinance. On the other hand, where reliance has
been upon municipal action of a governmental nature the same
doctrine has not been applied.6 8 Nor has it been applied to
actions constituting exercises of the police power.6 9 Since mu-
nicipal civil rights regulation is not only within the police
power,70 but also a governmental function, the dictum of Laird
and Staples should be considered irrelevant.
The second, and most easily avoided, judicial restriction on
the scope of municipal action is the stricture that no municipality
may legislate extraterritorially.71 Since civil rights legislation
is no more likely to violate this restriction than any other form
of municipal action, no discussion is necessary.
Another restriction on municipal initiative was established
by State ex rel. Peers v. Fitzgerald.7 2 According to that case,
municipalities may not confer contempt powers on adminis-
trative agencies such as city councils. Thus, orders emanating
from such groups as human rights commissions cannot be en-
forced by means of contempt proceedings. On the basis of the
Peers holding, it can be argued that municipal agencies should
65. 196 Minn. 303, 265 N.W. 58 (1936).
66. Id. at 307, 265 N.W. at 60.
67. For example, at common law an innkeeper could refuse to serve
anyone for any reason whatsoever. Thus, an ordinance preventing dis-
crimination in restaurants would infringe upon that right.
68. W.H. Barber Co. v. Minneapolis, 227 Minn. 77, 34 N.W.2d 710
(1948); Alexander Co. v. Owatonna, 222 Minn. 312, 24 N.W.2d 244 (1946).
69. City of St. Paul v. Haugbro, 93 Minn. 59, 100 N.W. 470 (1904).
70. See notes 43-50 supra, and accompanying text.
71. See Burnsville v. Bloomington, 268 Minn. 84, 128 N.W.2d 97
(1964). See also R. MADDOX, EXTRATERIuTORIAL POWERS OF MUNICIPAL-
TIEs (1955); Anderson, The Extraterritorial Powers of Cities, 10 AMmN. L.
REv. 475 (1926).
72. 131 Minn. 116,154 N.W. 750 (1915).
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also be denied the right to exercise injunctive powers, since
these powers (usually enforced by contempt proceedings) present
the same threat of arbitrariness as contempt powers. Notwith-
standing the Peers analogy, the inability of municipal courts to
issue injunctions,7 3 standing alone, denies municipalities the
most effective sanction available for the enforcement of their
ordinances. Any solution to this problem would require en-
abling legislation, possibly in the form of an amendment to the
Act Against Discrimination, of the sort contained in sections
902 and 903 of the Model Anti-Discrimination Act.74
The last limitation on the exercise of municipal civil rights
powers is found in the following general rule:
•. . a municipal corporation cannot create by ordinance a right
of action between third persons or enlarge the common law or
statutory duty or liability of citizens among themselves. 75
The reason given for this rule is that its absence would allow
innumerable jurisdictions to formulate divergent rules for count-
less legal issues.70  This consideration indicates that the enact-
ment of municipal laws should be permissible only when truly
necessary for the proper performance of a municipal duty.77
Thus, municipal civil rights legislation providing for civil relief
should be held invalid unless vital to the effective protection of
human rights.
The need for affording civil rights litigants the possibility
of civil relief is obvious. The most effective form of civil relief
-the injunction-is not available to municipalities or issuable by
municipal courts.78 A fine imposed by municipal ordinances
could be no more than $1,000.7 9 Thus, without the ability to re-
cover substantial civil damages, there is little chance that a dis-
criminatory practice will receive effective consideration. On
73. MINN. STAT. § 488.05(d) (1967). Municipal ordinances are not
enforceable in district courts.
74. MODEL ACT §§ 902 and 903 provide:
A political subdivision may adopt and enforce an ordinance
prohibiting discrimination because of race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin not in conflict with a provision of this Act.
A political subdivision ... may create a local commission to
promote the purposes of this Act and to secure for all individuals
within the jurisdiction of the political subdivision or subdivisions
freedom from discrimination. ...
75. E. McQUILLN, THE LAW OF Mu CIcPAL CORPOATIONS § 22.01 (3d
ed. 1949).
76. Sandalow, Municipal Power 679.
77. Id. at 678. The American Municipal Ass'n Model Const. Pro-
vision for Municipal Home Rule 19 also supports this position.
78. See note 73 supra, and accompanying text.
79. MIN. STAT. § 488.04 (1967).
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balance, therefore, the danger of divergent municipal regulations
is outweighed by the benefits which would be gained by permit-
ting municipal damage provisions.
As we have seen, the power of municipalities to act in the
area of civil rights is circumscribed by judicial proscriptions,
the constitution and the State Act Against Discrimination.
Nevertheless, a number of valuable steps could be taken at the
municipal level. For example, a municipality could properly
expand the areas in which discrimination is prohibited by
broadening the definition of "real property"80 to include all
buildings and structures as well as all interests in real estate
cooperatives. Municipalities could prohibit any printing or ad-
vertising with discriminatory overtones. They could also rectify
some of the errors made by the draftsmen of the State Act
Against Discrimination. For example, the present racial im-
balance plan of the Minneapolis School Board, which is of
questionable validity under sections. 363.03 (5) (2), and (3) of the
State Act,8' could be validated by municipal legislation. In
these and other ways, municipal initiative in this area could
facilitate an end to discrimination in this state.
IV. CONCLUSION
The power to legislate in the field of civil rights granted to
Minnesota municipalities by the state's home rule provision pro-
vides these municipalities with the opportunity to experiment
with local solutions to a problem which affects each com-
munity differently. It further provides them with the oppor-
tunity of testing whether more extensive measures than those
provided by the state anti-discrimination act would significantly
80. M1NN. STAT. § 363.01(12) (1966).
81. Under the Minneapolis plan non-white elementary student
must come from a school in which the white students comprise 80
per cent of the total attendance. The figure is 90 per cent for sec-
ondary schools. 1tnx. STAT. § 363.03(5) (2) forbids any educational
institution to "exclude, expel, limit, or otherwise discriminate against
an individual seeking admission as a student...." AMN. STAT. § 363.03
(5) (3) forbids schools to "make or use a .. . form of application for
admission that elicits ... information ... concerning the race ... of
an applicant for admission, except as permitted by regulations of the
[human rights] department." The state Human Rights Department has
not yet authorized the Minneapolis transfer plan.
The major difficulty might have been avoided by adopting a provi-
sion similar to § 504 of the MODEL ACT. See Auerbach, The 1967 Amend-
ments to the Minnesota State Act Against Discrimination and the Uni-
form Law Commissioners' Model Anti-Discrimination Act: A Compara-
tive Analysis and Evaluation, 52 Mum. L. REv. 231 (1967).
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reduce the racial tension plaguing our cities. The exercise of
this authority will also breathe new life into home rule mu-
nicipalities thereby enabling them to take the kind of active
social role which they must assume if they are to be valuable
governmental units. Finally, the power to legislate in the area
of civil rights provides municipalities with the opportunity to
contribute significantly to the elimination of discrimination; by
intelligently administered and enforced local regulations, elicit-
ing a higher degree of support than state ordinances, munici-
palities can more strongly encourage an end to the attitudes
producing discrimination.
